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  Université Laval, GREEN and CIRANO
Dans cet article, je considère le problème de l'élaboration d'un contrat
auto-sélecteur pour un principal qui achète un bien d'un agent, lequel est en mesure
d'effectuer un investissement réduisant ses coûts de production avant l'étape
contractuelle. Ceci crée une situation de hold-up de laquelle l'agent se protège en
choisissant son niveau d'investissement de manière aléatoire. En retour, cet aléa
incite le principal à concéder des « rentes » informationnelles à l'agent afin qu'il
révèle son type. À l'équilibre, le montant de ces « rentes » équivaut au coût de
l'investissement et le contrat exhibe une politique de prix telle que le revenu
marginal de l'agent correspond à sa courbe de coût marginal de long terme. Puisque
le « type » de l'agent, dans ce modèle, est une variable endogène, je soutiens l'idée
que les « rentes » devraient être interprétées comme des quasi-rentes compensant
l'agent pour ses coûts d'investissement.
I consider the problem of the design of an optimal self-selecting
contract scheme for a principal who is buying a good from an agent which has the
opportunity of making a cost-reducing unobservable investment prior to the
contracting stage. Because of a hold-up problem, the agent will randomize on his
investment level. This forces the principal to spend informational "rents" to
achieve screening. In equilibrium, these "rents" match the investment costs and the
resulting contract yields a price schedule such that the marginal revenue of the
agent equals his long run marginal cost curve. Since the agent’s "type" is an
endogenously determined characteristic, I argue that informational "rents" should
be interpreted as quasi-rents that stand as a payment factor for investment.
Mots Clés : Investissement spécifique, hold-up, observabilité, design de
mécanisme, renégociation
Keywords : Specific investment, hold-up, observability, mechanism design,
renegotiation
1 Introduction
Consider a rm that must sink an investment in order to produce a good.
The protability of such a venture depends on whether the rm expects
or not to recover its sunk costs from future sales. Once the investment is
sunk, the rm is exposed to the risk that its clients reduce their demand
or the price they are willing to pay. Even if the good is very valuable,
it may still be advantageous for the clients to never pay the rm more
than its variable costs. When the good and the investment are specic
to a client, and have a lesser intrinsic value outside the relationship, the
rm has little option but to accept such a proposal. There is then less
incentive for the rm to invest in the rst place and the social benets
of investment may be lost.
This is an illustration of Williamson's (1983) classic \hold-up" prob-
lem. There are two sets of circumstances when the hold up problem can
generally be solved; vertical integration and commitment with binding
contracts. If the client and the rm vertically integrate, the issue of who
shall absorb the investment costs becomes economically irrelevant. But
vertical integration is often an unrealistic option. It creates problems of
its own by substituting internal management of resources, which can be
subject to costly moral hazard eects, for market transactions. Hence,
the general analysis of investment usually implicitly assumes that bind-
ing contracts are possible. With such contracts, the rm's clients or
possibly some institutions like banks, can commit themselves to buy to-
day the rm's future production at a price that internalizes investment
costs.
Ecient investment can then be achieved under various assumptions
about the information structure (Rogerson, 1992). Yet, in many cases,
such contracts are unmanageable. For instance, with respect to inter-
national business transactions, it may prove dicult or even impossible
for a local rm to eciently sue a foreign rm for a breach of contract
(Thomas and Worrall, 1994; Choi and Esfahani, 1998). Firms doing
business with the government may reasonably doubt that the return
they expect from some specic long-term project will eectively be paid
fully in the future, under all circumstances, because of the government's
sensitivity to public opinion and its ability to change the law (Vickers,
1993). In other cases, the client may not even be identied at the invest-
ment stage (consider the development of a new product). Even when
binding contracts are eective, enforcing them usually involves the judi-
ciary system and that can have a very costly and unpredictable outcome.
For instance, if the \specic" good involved is a common good of a \spe-
cic" quality that can be observed by the rm and its client but not by
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the courts. The rm would still be able to obtain a reduced price from
the market but would lose the specic value added in quality.
One way of looking at the hold-up problem is to point out the wedge
between the sharing rules that are used to distribute investment costs ex
ante and investment returns ex post. Another approach to mitigate the
problem is then to identify specic bargaining subgames whose outcomes
reduce that wedge. Tirole (1986) pionneered this route by showing that
investment incentives could be increased under asymmetric information
because the ex post sharing rule that results from a bargaining subgame
is generally sensible to the information structure.
In this paper, I highlight the fact that the privacy of the investment
decision provides the party who makes that investment with a sucient
strategic advantage to protect the return on investment from a hold-up.
There is a principal who wants her agent to invest in a costly technol-
ogy in order to reduce the variable cost of producing some good. The
principal is limited to short-term contracts and cannot sign a binding
contract prior to the investment stage. Under perfect information, the
agent would invest too little because of the hold up problem: he would
justiably fear that the principal would refuse to pay for the investment
cost at the contracting stage. But if the agent invests privately and if
that piece of information is valuable to the principal, then the princi-
pal will be willing to yield informational rents to the agent, through a
screening mechanism. These rents, in turn, will indirectly nance in-
vestment. My model can be interpreted as a classical principal-agent
model [4] to which I add an initial investment stage where the agent has
the opportunity of choosing his \type", at a price (the cost of invest-
ment). In equilibrium, the agent randomizes on his investment support
thus inducing a common-knowledge \type" distribution that is the ba-
sis of the subsequent play.
1
Being \tough" with the agent is an option
for the principal only when he has good knowledge of the rm's cost
structure. Without this knowledge, she runs the risk of making an unac-
ceptable oer to the agent that can jeopardize the ex post realization of
the gains from trade. An unobserved mixed strategy allows the agent to
\hide" his investment behind a veil of endogenously created noise. An
uninformed principal then has a weaker bargaining position which might
reduce the ex ante incidence of the hold-up problem. In Tirole's model,
the principal's reply to this randomization is to increase the probability
of disagreement ex post. My approach extends Tirole's analysis to the
case where the principal can use the production level as an instrument
1
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for an application of this technique in a moral
hazard problem.
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to screen the agent at the contracting stage. In equilibrium, the parties
always reach an agreement. When the possibility of renegotiating the
contract is added, screening becomes impossible and the probability of
disagreement increases.
The equilibrium contract I obtain has a deceptively simple structure:
it amounts to paying the agent a nonlinear price such that his marginal
revenue curve is equal to his long run marginal cost curve (LRMC ).
Contrary to most models of asymmetric information cast in a Bayesian
framework, the distribution of \types" is endogenous in my model (the
outcome of an equilibrium mixed strategy) so that observable variables
like production and contracts (\prices") are functions only of taste and
technological parameters like in classical economics.
Laont and Tirole (1993) have proposed an explanation of the hold-
up problem under asymmetric information that does not involve a mixed
strategy for investment. In their model, investment aects the distribu-
tion of variable costs but not their support. Since variable costs depend
on an exogenous random variable, the principal will try to screen the
agent ex post. But they make the implicit assumption that it is not
possible to contract after investment has taken place but prior costs are
realized. One can show (Gonzalez, 1997) in that context that it is always
optimal for the principal to screen agents with respect to their ex post
variable costs but to pool them with respect to their investment level.
Since the agent's payo function is strictly concave in investment and
all investment levels are treated equally (pooled) by the principal, the
agent will then play a pure strategy by choosing the unique maximizer
on his investment set.
In a recent paper, Gul (1997) analyzes a model of bargaining between
a seller and a buyer in an environment very similar to the one presented
here. In Gul's paper, the buyer has the opportunity ex ante to make
an investment that increases the gains from trade ex post. By allowing
the investment to be made privately by the buyer and by considering
a sequential bargaining subgame of oers and counter-oers, Gul comes
to a surprising conclusion. Not only does the unobservability create a
need for the seller to screen the buyer using time as an instrument, but
the outcome of the whole game will come arbitrarily close to eciency
as the delay between oers goes to zero even if the seller gathers all the
surplus. In my model, the principal will also screen the agent because
of the equilibrium induced randomized strategy and will gather all the
surplus realized in the relationship, but I do fall short of eciency. Not
only does the agent invest suboptimally but he generally chooses an
inecient level of production given his investment.
In Bayesian models, where the distribution of types is exogenous, un-
3
observability of the agent characteristics usually diminishes social welfare
as parties engage in wasteful rent-seeking behavior. When the distribu-
tion is endogenous, unobservability actually prevents the distribution of
types to collapse on the least ecient type { an even worse outcome {
so that unobservablity actually helps to maintain social welfare.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The model is presented
in the next section and solved in section 3. Three analytical examples
are proposed in section 4 to illustrate the links between the agent's cost
function and his equilibrium mixed strategy. In section 5, I adress the
welfare implications of the unobservability of investment. In section 6,
I add the possibility of renegotiation. The last section concludes with a
discussion about the empirical predictive power of principal-agent models
based on incomplete information games vs thoses, like the one in this
paper, that rely on games of complete but imperfect information.
2 The model
Consider a two-period relationship between two risk-neutral players.
There is a rm (hereafter, the agent) which produces a good that can be
sold at a unit price of p 2 (0; 1) on the market and a potential client (the
principal) with linear preferences. I assume that the rm can produce
two varieties of the good, one being tailored to the specic needs of the
principal.
Let q
M
and q
P
be the quantities produced by the rm for the market
and the principal where q
P
is composed only of the variety preferred
by the principal. Both varieties would be perceived as identical on the
market and would sell at price p < 1 but the principal values each unit
of q
M
at p and each unit of q
P
at one. I assume that there is little if no
chance that the principal could procure himself at price p through the
market the good of the specic variety he values the most.
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I assume that there are limited economies of scope in using the rm's
installed capacity for a joint production of both varieties by letting the
total variable cost of producing q
M
and q
P
be a function of their sum
q = q
M
+ q
P
alone.
To reduce production costs, the agent has the opportunity of making
an investment e  0. The cost of producing the joint output q is then
2
In what follows, the principal is given all the bargaining power so that her par-
ticipation constraint is never binding. What matters is that the agent cannot expect
to nd a customer, other than the principal, ready to pay a price higher than p for
his production of the specic variety.
4
c(q; e) where c is a strictly convex function with
3
c
q
> 0. Investment
e is irreversible; hence, once undertaken, total costs c(q; e) can be de-
composed in xed costs c(0; e) and variables costs c(q; e)  c(0; e). I also
assume that c
e
(q; e)   c
e
(0; e) < 0 and c
ee
(q; e)   c
ee
(0; e) > 0 for all q
so that investment reduces variable costs at a decreasing rate.
I will also need a natural sorting condition c
qe
< 0 which says that
investment decreases marginal cost at any given level of production (that
is, investment increases capacity) and two technical conditions: c
qqe
< 0
and c
qqq
 0. The rst one insures that the second order conditions for
the principal's program are always satised while the second one allows
us to disregard stochastic contracting schemes.
The game. The principal observes neither investment nor costs, but
is aware of the production set of the agent; that is, he knows c. I also
assume that he cannot sign binding contracts prior to the investment
stage and that it is common knowledge that he holds all of the bargaining
power during the entire game.
Because both varieties of the good have a market value, there al-
ways exists an incentive for the agent to invest. Nevertheless, eciency
requires that the agent deals with the principal who has a higher valua-
tion than the market for a specic variety that is a perfect substitute in
output to the common variety. If the agent expects a fair deal with the
principal to be dicult, he might focus his attention only on the market
and invest suboptimally. The problem is then to provide the agent with
incentives to invest optimally. More precisely, I want to show to what
extent the unobservability of investment does provide such incentives.
The course of events is as follows: in the rst period, the agent
privately invests e. Once e has been sunk, the agent is said to be of
\type" e and both players enter the second stage
4
where they must
agree, through some bargaining subgame, on an allocation that includes
a production plan q 2 Q and a monetary transfer t 2 T from the principal
to the agent (the sets Q and T are non negative values of q and the real
line for T ).
The precise bargaining subgame that is played at that stage is of
crucial importance in determining the equilibrium of the entire game
and, in particular, the investment strategy that will be played by the
agent. For instance, if the agent expects that he will be able to make
a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the principal at the second stage, it is easy
to see that he will undertake the socially optimal amount of investment
3
Suscripts denote partial derivatives for functions with more than one argument.
For functions with a single argument, the prime notation will be used.
4
The interim stage in the terminology of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983); that is,
when the agent knows his type.
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and that he will oer to produce the socially optimal level of the good
for a transfer that will cover both xed and variable costs and all the
gains from trade.
In that case, the player that invests reaps all the ex post gains from
trade and will thus optimally equalize the marginal cost of investment to
its marginal return on these gains when making ex ante his investment
decision. A hold-up problem occurs when the bargaining procedure does
not share the ex post gains from trade commensurately to the ex ante
investment costs that have to be born by the players.
The bargaining subgame beginning in the second stage is an integral
part of the game and cannot conceptually be modelled as an endogenous
choice.
5
Hence, the ex post bargaining procedure is given exogeneously
here by way of the class of contracts that the principal can oer on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Nevertheless, the agent always has the external
opportunity to use his capacity to sell on the competitive market at price
p. As p is increased, the specic gains from trade that can be realized
with the principal are decreased and the option value for the agent of
going to the market is increased. Hence, p can be viewed as a measure
of the incidence of the hold-up problem in this economy.
6
Strategies and payos. A pure strategy for the principal is an oer
of a contract  (to be dened later) at the bargaining stage. Since
investment costs are sunk at this stage, only variable costs matter to
the agent in this subgame. If the agent refuses the contract proposed
by the principal, the game ends: the principal pays nothing and receives
nothing.
7
The agent can use all of his capacity to produce and sell on
the market at price p. That outcome yields a feasible payo of
w^(e; p)  max
q2Q
(pq   c(q; e)) (1)
to the agent. For all given p  0, this is a well dened strictly concave
function of e. Furthermore, since there is a unique solution to the r.h.s.
of (1), we can dene the argmax function q^(e; p). Throughout this paper,
I will use the caret notation to indicate ecient level values; hence q^(e; b)
5
One could think of a game where parties choose together initially to play a par-
ticular bargaining subgame at the interim stage, but that would amount to assuming
that commitment is possible.
6
The severity of the hold-up problem increases as p decreases. Note that if full en-
forcement contracts were available at the investment stage, eciency would required
that all trade be conducted with the principal. Hence, interestingly, the rst best
benchmark is unaected by p.
7
Since the principal has linear preferences, there are no wealth eects and the prin-
cipal purchases on the market will not depend on whether he contracted successfully
or not with the agent.
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is the ecient level of production that equates marginal benet b (either
p or 1) to marginal cost c
q
given investment level e. To insure (and
simplify) the construction of an equilibrium, I also assume that,
8b; 9(b) such that w^(e; b) < 0;8e > (b): (2)
Hence, investing a \large" amount can never be an option. To lighten
the notation, I will write w^(e) = w^(e; 1) and q^(e) = q^(e; 1) when no
confusion arises. Likewise, I note
e^(q)  argmin
e0
c(q; e) (3)
the level of investment that minimizes total cost of producing q. Note
that c(q; e^(q)) is the traditionnal long run cost curve of the rm. Finally,
when e and q are simultaneously chosen, I note
w

(b)  max
e0;q2Q
(bq   c(q; e)) : (4)
and let fe

(b); q

(b)g be the solution to the r.h.s. of (4). Existence
and uniqueness of these values is insured by the global convexity of the
program. I assume that for all p > 0, (4) with b = p has an interior
solution. It follows that we have an interior solution in b = 1; that
e^(q) > 0 for all q > 0 and it is then straightforward to verify that
e

(b) = e^(q

(b)) and q

(b) = q^(e

(b); b).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the principal will
never propose to pay more than an average price of 1 per unit of the
good produced by the agent. It follows that the agent cannot expect to
make a prot greater than w^(e; 1) for some e. Since the agent can forego
the expected relationship with the principal and guarantee himself a
market payo of w^(e; p) > 0, he will never invest more than (1). Hence,
it is common knowledge that the agent will invest some e 2 [0; (1)]  E.
Suppose now that the agent has invested privately and consider the
subgame that begins in the second stage when the principal, holding all
the bargaining power, negociates a contract with the unidentied agent.
Let
~
F be the Bayesian prior of the principal about the level of investment
made by the agent over E. By the Revelation principle, the equilibrium
outcome of any Bayesian rational communication subgame played by the
principal and the agent can be reached by the take-it-or-leave-it oer of a
direct mechanism that satises individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC ).
Formally, one should dene a contract  as a mapping from the \type"
(message) space E into the general class of stochastic contracts, that is
7
the space (QT ) of distribution functions overQT . A mixed strategy
can then be dened as a randomization into this space. I restrict the
scope of the analysis by constructing an equilibrium where the principal
plays a pure strategy in the contract space.
8
These contracts can be
represented as pairs (e) of functions (q(e); t(e))
E
and form a menu in
which the agent may select a particular allocation (m) = (q(m); t(m))
after having sent a message m about his type e. If allocation (e) is
selected, then the principal gets q(e)  t(e).
Following the oer made by the principal, the agent either accepts
or refuses. In both cases, he may proceed to the market where he can
sell at will at unit price p. Once the contract negociation has been
settled and once the agent has completed the booking of orders on the
market, production and exchange take place. Since refusing the contract
and going to the market can be replicated with a contract that species
zero production and no transfer, any agent that has invested e would
behave rationally by accepting any contract that satises the following
IR constraint for type e:
r(e)  t(e)  w^(e; p) + max
q2Q
(pq   c(q(e) + q; e))  0: (IR)
Here, r(e) is the \rent" gathered by an agent of type e from a self-
selecting contract with respect to his best alternative w^(e; p).
9
This
formulation encompasses the case where the agent accepts the principal's
contract but still wishes to sell the output of his remaining capacity on
the competitive market.
The agent accepts any self-selecting contract that satises (IR) given
his type e. For these contracts, the IC constraints are summarized by
r(e)  t(m)  w^(e; p) + max
q2Q
(pq   c(q(m) + q; e)) ; 8e 2 E and 8m 2 E:
(IC )
Whenever an agent is left with an excess capacity (q(e) < q^(e; p)), he
will choose to be active on the market. By doing so, the agent will
equalize his marginal rate of substitution MRS between q and money to
p; it follows that the MRS is constant for these types and the sorting
condition (that the MRS does not decrease with e) is trivially satised.
When q(e)  q^(e; p), the solution in the r.h.s. of (IC ) is zero and the
8
Under my convexity assumptions, one can show that stochastic contracts are
dominated by non stochastic ones. See Laont and Tirole (1993).
9
w^(e; p) includes xed costs. These are irrelevant ex post, but are cancelled out
with the same implicit xed costs in c(q(e) + q; e).
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agent produces only for the principal. In this case, the sorting condition
is given by
 q
0
(e)c
qe
(q(e); e)  0:
This condition is always satised provided that q(e) is non-decreasing.
Because the agent's payo function is quasi-linear, the sorting condition
is also sucient to insure global IC . It follows that the local approach
for IC can be applied, which yields
r
0
(e) =
8
<
:
0 if q(e) < q^(e; p);
c
e
(q^(e; p); e)  c
e
(q(e); e)  0 if q(e)  q^(e; p):
(5)
In the second regime, the agent is left with no excess capacity for the
market; accordingly, his rent pattern reects the (variable) cost savings
that can be achieved with a better type (adjusted for the fact that his
reservation payo would be modied).
To interpret the rst case (excess capacity), suppose that the princi-
pal is locally paying a xed price ~p for each of the q(e) units produced
for him by the agent, that is t(e) = ~pq(e); for dq = q
0
(e)de = 1, marginal
transfer is thus ~p; dierentiating (IR) on both sides and using (5) we get
~p = c
q
(q^(e; p); p) = p; that is, the principal must pay the market price
for each unit he buys. Obviously, as the next lemma shows, that regime
is never played as the principal will always prefer that an agent of type
e produce at least q^(e; p).
Lemma 1. In an optimal self-selecting contract, we can assume that the
agent produces only for the principal, that is q(e)  q^(e; p);8e 2 E.
Proof. Consider rst the following function s and its derivative with
respect to :
s(; e)  p +max
q2Q
(pq   c( + q; e)) ;
s

(; e) =
(
0 if  < q^(e; p);
p  c
q
(; e)  0 otherwise;
 0; so that s is non-increasing in .
Then assume we have an optimal self-selecting contract that satises
IR and IC and for which q(e) < q^(e; p) for some type e. Consider raising
q(e) to q^(e; p) and t(e) by p(q^(e; p)  q(e)) for type e. That modication
can only increase the payo to the principal while keeping the agent's
9
payo constant. Clearly, to disprove the lemma, for some optimal self-
selecting contract, this type of modication should be impossible. In
other words, it must disrupt the IC constraint (IC ) for at least some
type e
0
. Yet, for any e
0
, the r.h.s. of that constraint is decreased by
s(q(e); e
0
)  s(q^(e; p); e
0
) > 0;
so that the constraint is actually relaxed, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Because of lemma 1, we know that equation (5) simplies to
r
0
(e) = c
e
(q^(e; p); e)  c
e
(q(e); e)
for an optimal self-selecting contract.
3 The equilibrium
Even if we assume that the principal plays a pure strategy in a Nash
equilibrium, it is easy to see that the agent will be randomizing over his
investment set. To show this, suppose the agent plays a pure strategy
e 2 E in equilibrium. Anticipating this strategy to be ~e, the principal
will invite the agent to produce q^(~e; 1) > q^(~e; p) but will be willing to
pay only the market price p for the rst q^(~e; p) units (the revenue the
agent could get on the market) plus a premium no more than the excess
in variable costs needed to accomodate the higher marginal value of the
principal:
t(~e) = pq^(~e; p) + c(q^(~e; 1); ~e)  c(q^(~e; p); ~e):
Anticipating this contract, the agent can choose to minimize the cost of
producing q^(~e; 1) by setting his investment level to e^(q^(~e; 1)) or he can
plan to deviate on the market and to set e according to e

(p).
To obtain an equilibrium in pure strategies where the contract is
accepted, we need ~e = e

(1) so that
e^(q^(~e; 1)) = e^(q^(e

(1); 1)) = e^(q

(1)) = e

(1);
and the expectation of the principal matches the actual strategy played
by the agent. But then, whenever p < 1, a deviation would give the
agent w^(e

(p); p)  w^(e

(1); p) > 0, and the equilibrium would not hold.
Since, in equilibrium, the agent randomizes on his investment level,
the principal will nd it protable to try to screen the agent with respect
to his variable cost structure using the production level as an instrument.
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The easiest way to construct a Nash equilibrium is to check whether a
given pair of strategies are best replies one to another. Following that
route, I construct the following equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium where the agent ran-
domizes with F over E

= [e

(p); e

(1)] and the principal oers a non
stochastic contract  = (q(e); t(e))
e2E

where q(e) solves
c
e
(q(e); e) = 0; (6)
transfers cover total costs and provide an equivalent to the market payo
t(e) = c(q(e); e) +w

(p); and F is a continuous distribution function on
E

given by
F (e) = 1  exp
 
 
Z
e
e

(p)
(1=h(~e))d~e
!
(7)
where
h(e) =  
1  c
q
(q(e); e)
c
qe
(q(e); e)
: (8)
Proof. Let E

 E be the actual bounded support of the distribution
played by the agent and let e be its lower bound (obviously, e > 0 since
the agent can always produce for the market). Dene a mixed behav-
ioral strategy for investment as a (right-hand continuous) distribution
function F where F (e) = 0, for all e < e. As in Gul (1997), dene
e = supfejF (e) = 0g to be an extremum of E

and let e be an in-
creasing point of F if either F is discontinuous in e or, for all  > 0,
F (e + ) > F (e). We have e 2 E

i e is an increasing point of F and
all e 2 E

must yield the same expected return. By construction, e is a
point of increase of F .
Let  be the contract oered in equilibrium by the principal. The ex
post return from  to an agent that has invested e is given by (IR) and
evolves with e according to (5).
In any right-hand neighborhood [e; e+ ] of e we can nd a point of
increase e (perhaps e itself) that is played in equilibrium. By lemma
1, we can assume that the agent will only produce for the principal; it
follows that his ex ante payo (relative to his best ex ante alternative)
when investing e is
t(e)  c(q(e); e)  w

(p) = r(e)  (w

(p)  w^(e; p))  0: (9)
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This payo is the dierence between the ex post rent r(e) from the con-
tract, which compensates better types for the marginal variable cost sav-
ings they could appropriate for themselves by lying about their type, and
the ex ante opportunity cost of investment w

(p)  w^(e; p). This payo
must be non negative otherwise the agent would simply choose to pro-
duce for the market. For any decreasing sequence of (e) that converges
toward e, the corresponding sequence (r(e)) must converge to r(e) = 0
otherwise, since rents are non decreasing with e, the principal could in-
crease her payo by augmenting  with a xed strictly positive payment
no less than r(e) which would not disrupt any IC or IR constraint. It
follows that the non negative sequence of dierences (w

(p)   w^(e; p))
must converge to zero, which implies e = e

(p).
I will establish later that e = e

(1). For the time being, assume that
F is a continuously dierentiable distribution function on E

= [e

(p); e]
with density f . I compute the optimal contract  given that the agent
randomizes with F on E

(Guesnerie and Laont, 1984).
Ex post IC requires that q(e) be a non decreasing function and we
know by lemma 1 that r
0
(e) = c
e
(q^(e; p); e)   c
e
(q(e); e). The optimal
contract then solves
max

Z
e
e

(p)
(q(e)  r(e)  c(q(e); e))f(e)de
subject to the monotonous condition q
0
(e)  0 and
r
0
(e) = c
e
(q^(e; p); e)  c
e
(q(e); e);
r(e

(p)) = 0:
Leaving aside the monotonous condition for the moment, the Hamilto-
nian function of this program is
H(e) = (q(e)  r(e)   c(q(e); e))f(e) + (e)(c
e
(q^(e; p); e)  c
e
(q(e); e)):
The rst-order conditions for H(e) are:
@H(e)
@q(e)
= f(e)(1  c
q
(q(e); e))  (e)c
qe
(q(e); e) = 0 (10)

0
(e) =  
@H(e)
@r(e)
= f(e) (11)
where (e)  0 is the shadow cost of increasing the rent of agent e.
The boundary condition at e = e is unconstrained, hence (e) = 0.
Integrating (11) I get
 (e) = (e)  (e) =
Z
e
e

0
(~e)d~e =
Z
e
e
f(~e)d~e = 1  F (e): (12)
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The optimal quantity q(e) for type e is thus implicitly given by
f(e)(1  c
q
(q(e); e)) + (1  F (e))c
qe
(q(e); e) = 0 (13)
which implicitely identies q(e).
Once q(e) is determined, the necessary rents can be computed:
r(e) =
Z
e
e

(p)
(c
e
(q^(~e; p); ~e)  c
e
(q(~e); ~e))d~e: (14)
Finally, as e! e, the term 1  F (e) vanishes so that (13) becomes
f(e)(1  c
q
(q(e); e)) = 0
which implies
q(e) = q^(e; 1); (15)
that is, the classical eciency-at-the-top result.
I now impose equilibrium conditions to determine the value of e and
to characterize completely the equilibrium contract. For F to be played
in equilibrium over E

, I need (9) to hold with equality over E

(this
implies the transfer equation directly). Hence, dierentiating (9), I must
have
 c
e
(q(e); e) = 0 over E

. (16)
To reconcile this equilibrium condition with (15) I need e = e

(1) so
that E

= [e

(p); e

(1)]. Equation (16) gives q(e) as a function of e.
Dierentiating it yields
q
0
(e) =  
c
ee
(q(e); e)
c
qe
(q(e); e)
> 0;
which is positive under our convexity assumptions. Hence, the monotonous
condition is satised in equilibrium. Substituting the implicit equilib-
rium solution q(e) of (16) in (13) yields an ordinary linear dierential
equation of the form
h(e)y
0
+ y = 1; (17)
where y = F (e), y
0
= f(e), the function h(e) (the inverse of the hazard
rate) is given by (8) and with initial condition F (e

(p)) = 0. Note that
h vanishes only at e

(1). This implies that (17) has a unique solution,
over any subset [e

(p); e

(1)  ],  > 0, given by (7) which is continuous
13
and dierentiable. Taking then the limit of F (e

(1)  ) as ! 0 yields
1, so F is a cumulative distribution function on E

. Q.E.D.
Given the equilibrium strategy F for the agent, the contract oered
by the principal is the standard screening contract a la Guesnerie and
Laont (1984) which yields the best possible weighting for the principal
between eciency in production and (ex post) \rent" extraction. Since
all pure strategies in the support of the mixed strategy played by the
agent must yield the same payo, these rents must match the investment
cost of having a more or less ex post ecient type. I shall talk of quasi
rents, in the Marshallian sense, since these rents are nothing more than
a minimum fair return on past investment in capital.
The equilibrium contract has a simple and very intuitive structure
which is illustrated in gure 1 with the traditional envelope representa-
tion (Viner, 1952) of short-run average costs (AC) curves.
10
It amounts
to paying the agent a marginal price of p for each of the rst q

(p)
units he agrees to produce, and equating marginal revenue (MR) to the
agent's long run marginal cost (LRMC ) for all additional units. To see
this, consider equation (6) which denes the optimal production plans,
that is, the function q(e). This equation is the rst-order condition of
program (3) that is related to points on the LRMC and LRAC curves.
The average revenue curve of the agent, that is, the unit price he will
receive for his production, is then increasing from p at q

(p) and is below
his MR curve. With such a scheme, the agent will produce until his ex
post (short-run) marginal cost curve MC (e) crosses his MR curve. This
happens at q(e) where his short-run average cost curve AC (e) is tangent
to his LRAC curve; hence, the agent's chosen production plan is cost ef-
cient. At that point, the agent's payo (average revenue minus average
cost times his production level; that is,the sum of the two darker areas)
is equal to his market payo (the sum of the two lighter areas). Hence,
from an ex ante point of view, the agent gets the same payo from each
investment level in [e

(p); e

(1)], and this induces him to randomize on
that support.
Since the equilibrium contract guarantees the market payo to the
agent, no hold-up will occur and the agent can invest with condence.
The complex part of the contract lies in the purchase policy q(e) that
prescribes lowering the principal's demand from a poorly capitalized rm
(e < e

(1)). It is given by (6) and manages to equate ex ante marginal
opportunity cost of investment and ex post marginal savings on vari-
able costs. Under full commitment, the optimal contract would equate
10
This gure matches the second analytical example discussed below.
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marginal utility (1) of the principal to the long-run marginal cost at
q

(1). That point is both ex ante and ex post ecient. In the absence of
commitment and under full observability of the investment decision, the
agent would simply refuse to invest more than e

(p). Ecient bargain-
ing would yield an ex post ecient production level at q^(e

(p); 1). If the
investment decision is kept private, then the equilibrium contract allows
the agent to choose any production level in [q

(p); q

(1)], say q(e), and
to receive a unit price of AR(e). It is easy to see that this contract is ex
post self-selecting since the most economical way to produce q(e) and to
realize sales of AR(e)q(e) is to be of type e so that costs are minimized
as the (short-run) average cost curve AC (e) reaches the LRAC curve in
q(e). Keeping investment private and producing at any q(e) is both ex
ante inecient with respect to q

(1) and ex post inecient with respect
to q^(e; 1) but it is cost ecient.
Simple static comparative analysis reveals that if the good has no
value outside the relationship (p = 0) or if the market is competitive
so that the agent's reservation payo is achieved at the minimum of his
LRAC curve, the contract (the AR curve) will follow the LRAC curve
so that the transfer will match only total costs. As p is increased, w

(p)
will rise so that all transfers will be shifted by an identical amount. Nev-
ertheless q(e) is unaected as long as it is no less than q

(p). It follows
that, for a given variation in p, the unit price t(e)=q(e) always changes
more for low levels of production, that is for low e. In a sense, high lev-
els of production orders are relatively more anchored to the principal's
valuation of 1 than to the market price.
4 Analytical examples
The shape of the distribution F depends on the derivative of h since
f
0
(e)
f(e)
=  
1 + h
0
(e)
h(e)
:
If h
0
  1 for all e, then the distribution will be skewed to the right
toward e

(1) and the agent will invest almost optimally most of the time;
since the ex post ineciency 1  c
q
(q; e) is reduced as e is increased, we
will get almost optimal production most of the time. On the other hand,
both ex ante and ex post ineciencies will be exacerbated if h
0
  1 as
the distribution will be skewed toward e

(p). Other possibles cases are
that of h
0
(e) =  1 which implies a uniform distribution over [e

(p); e

(1)]
and h
0
(e) rst lesser (greater) than  1, then equal to  1 at some interior
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~e, then greater (lesser) than  1 which would yield a bell-shaped (U-
shaped) distribution. Since q(e) increases with e, the distribution of
quantities will share the same characteristics.
I present below three analytical examples that illustrate the depen-
dence of the distribution F upon the cost function c. In all these exam-
ples, the reservation market price is set to p = 1=2. For each example,
I have graphed the Viner representation of the rm's cost structure for
three investment levels, that of e

(p), e

(1) and the median investment
level e such that F (e) = 1=2. The short-run marginal and average cost
functions (MC and AC ) are drawn for these three levels. The contract
provision (q(e); t(e)=q(e)) is represented by the lowest thick line between
q

(p) and q

(1).
Example 1. Let the cost function be
c(q; e) = exp(E  Q)(exp(q   e)  1) + exp(e E)  exp( E):
With this specication, the parameters E and Q are the ex ante ecient
levels of investment and production e^ = E and q^(E; 1) = q

(1) = Q. If
the agent expects to sell only on the market, he will set e

(p) = E+ln(p)
and q

(p) = Q+ 2 ln(p) for a prot of p
2
=2.
The rm's short-run marginal cost function is c
q
(q; e) = exp(q Q+
E  e) so that c
qe
(q; e) =   exp(q Q+E  e). Under observability, the
rm would invest e

(p) = E+ln(p) and would produce q

(p) = Q+2 ln(p)
to get the market payo of w

(p) = pq

(p) c(q

(p); e

(p)). The optimal
equilibrium contract under unobservability manages to keep this payo
constant over [E+ln(p); E] by having q(e) = Q 2(E e) and by paying
a unit price of
t(e)
q(e)
=
w

(e)
q(e)
+
c(q(e); e)
q(e)
;
=
p(2 ln(p) +Q  2) + 2 exp(e E)
Q  2(E   e)
;
which converges toward the LRAC curve as q(e) is increased. The inverse
of the hazard rate resumes to h(e) = exp(E   e)   1 and is decreasing
with h
0
(e)   1 so that the distribution will be skewed toward E. Using
(7), the equilibrium distribution is given by
F (e) =
exp(e E)  p
1  p
: (18)
This case is illustrated in gure 2 for parameters E = 1 and Q = 3.
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At p = 1=2, the price is set higher than the long-run breakeven point
11
.
If investment were observable, the agent would produce with certainty
q

(1=2) = 3   2 ln(2) ' 1:6137 with an investment of e

(1=2) = 1  
ln(2) ' :3069. From (18), we can compute the percentile function
(z) = E + ln((1  z)p+ z)
where (z) is the value of e that solves F (e) = z. The tick marks on the
abcissa represent the tenth percentiles of production. Hence, the median
investment level is at e = ln(3=4)+1 which yields q(e) = 3+2 ln(3=4) '
2:4246. The skewness of the distribution toward E is apparent as more
ticks are concentrated near q

(1).
Example 2. In this second example, the cost function is
c(q; e) = q
2
  2eq + 2e
2
:
With this function, investment decreases costs whenever q  2e. The
market solution would be for the rm to produce q

(p) = p with an
initial investment of e

(p) = p=2 and resulting prot of p
2
=2. The rst
best solution is q

(1) = 1 and e

(1) = 1=2. The equilibrium contract sets
q(e) = 2e and a transfer scheme of t(e)=q(e) = p
2
=4e+e. The agent then
randomizes according to h(e) = 1=2  e. Since h is linear in e, we have
h
0
(e) =  1 and the distribution will be uniform with f(e) = 2=(1  p)
over [p=2; 1]. The cost structure is depicted in gure 3 where the uniform
nature of the randomization is apparent by the equidistant ticks on the
abcissa (q is also distributed uniformly since it is a linear function of e).
Example 3. In this last example, the distribution will be skewed to-
ward e

(p). Let
c(q; e) =
q
2
2e
+
e
2
4
:
The inverse of the hazard rate function is h(e) =
p
e e and has derivative
h
0
(e) =  1 + 1=(2
p
e) >  1. It follows that the distribution
F (e) = 1 

1 
p
e
1  p

2
will be skewed to the left. See gure 4.
11
Consider the cost-minimizing investment level for production level q along the
LRAC curve. That level is given by E   (Q   q)=2 whenever the value is positive
and, as q is decreased, by zero otherwise (e  0 is then binding). Furthermore, given
our parametrization, one can show that B(e) = min
q2Q
c(q; e)=q increases with e. It
follows that the breakeven point is given at B(0) = lim
q!0
c(q; 0)=q ' :1353.
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5 Welfare consequences
Little mention has been made up to now of the consequences of unob-
servability on expected welfare. We know that expected investment will
rise but so will the incidence of ex post ineciencies in production. Un-
der perfect information, the agent ineciently never invests more than
e

(p) < e

(1) but always produces eciently given e

(p). Under imper-
fect information, the agent randomizes over E

and will invest eciently
some of the time. However he will produce ineciently q(e) < q^(e; 1)
most of the time.
Since the agent receives a payo of zero (net of his market payo)
whether the game is played under asymmetric or symmetric information
and since the principal can insure himself to pay no more than the market
price for q(e

(p)) units of variety 1 of the good (the amount he would
get under full observability), it is clear that unobservability can only
increase social welfare. This is in sharp constrast with Bayesian games of
incomplete information where unobservability of types diminishes social
welfare as players engage in rent seeking behavior.
This important dierence comes from the fact that traditionnal Bayesian
models assume that the distribution of types is exogenous so that it is not
aected by the observability issue. It follows that going from unobserv-
able to observable types increases welfare as all ineciencies associated
with bargainning under asymmetric information are resolved. When
types are endogenous, observability would cause the type distribution
to collapse to e

(p) at a great cost in social welfare. Unobservability
then allows more types to be played, so much that the presence of more
ecient types overcomes the fact that most types will now produce in-
eciently.
One may wonder if this overall gain is attributable to the fact the
agent now almost always invests a \little more" (as e  e

(p)) or to the
fact that almost ecient investment with almost ecient production is
now possible with some probability as e approaches e

(1)? Let w(e) =
q(e)  c(q(e); e). With observable investment, social welfare amounts to
w^(e

(p)). With unobservable investment, the agent randomizes on E

with F . I want to compare E
F
(w) with w^(e). Observe that w(e

(1)) =
w^(e

(1)). I then derive the following
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EF
(w)   w^(e

(p); 1) =
Z
E

w(e)f(e)de  w^(e

(p));
=
Z
E

((w(e)F (e))
0
  w
0
(e)F (e))de  w^(e

(p));
= w(e

(1)) 
Z
E

w
0
(e)F (e)de  w^(e

(p));
=
Z
E

(w^
0
(e)  w
0
(e)F (e))de =
Z
E

(e)de; (19)
where
(e) = w^
0
(e)  w
0
(e)F (e);
= (1  F (e))w^
0
(e)  F (e)(w
0
(e)  w^
0
(e)):
One can check that (e

(p)) = w^
0
(e

(p)) > 0 and (e

(1)) = 0 but

0
(e

(1)) > 0 so that  reaches zero in e

(1) from below
12
and it has
at least another zero in the interior of E

. Since  is positive for low
values of e but negative for high values, the overall positive contribution
to welfare of unobservability can be traced to the fact that the agent
now always invests a little more than e

(p).
13
Consider the contribution
to welfare of a marginal increase in e under unobservability. As e is
increased, total feasible surplus is increased by w^
0
(e) each time the agent
invests at least e, that is, 1   F (e) of the time. On the other hand, an
increase in the support of e implies more distorsions on the production
plan of lower types (in proportion F (e)), that is, a marginal increase in
the amount of welfare destruction w^(e) w(e) for each of these types in
order to prevent higher types to mimic these types. When e is low, a
little more investment has an important positive marginal eect (since
12
We have

0
(e) = w^
00
(e)  w
00
(e)F (e)  w
0
(e)f(e):
In e = e

(1), F (e

(1)) = 1, w
0
(e

(1)) = 0 and q^(e

(1)) = q(e

(1)) = q

(1), it follows
that

0
(e

(1)) = w^
00
(e

(1))  w
00
(e

(1))
=
(c
qe
)
2
c
qq
+ c
qq
(c
ee
)
2
(c
qe
)
2
> 0:
13
This heuristic argument, based on the function , and what follows in the rest of
the paragraph, depends a lot on unspecied accounting conventions. If
R
(e)de = k,
then so does
R
~
(e)de where
~
(e) = 2kf(e)   (e).
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e is low) and the negative eect is low since production plans need to
be distorted only a little. When e is high, the opposite applies and
the marginal contribution is negative. (e

(1)) = 0 since additional
distorsions become less necessary at the margin as q(e) ! q^(e) when
e! e

(1).
6 Renegotiation
In this section, I extend the game of section 3 by allowing the agent to
propose a take-it-or-leave-it oer of renegotiation after he has accepted
the initial contract  proposed by the principal and committed himself
to some allocation (e) = (q(e); t(e)) in . To simplify the analysis, I
will assume that the market price is 0 so that both the ex ante and the
ex post reservation payos of the agent are always zero with an initial
investment of e

(0) = 0. As before, a refusal at the initial contracting
stage terminates the relationship but if the principal refuses the renego-
tiation oer, then allocation (e) is to be implemented. I will refer to
this game as renegotiation conditional on acceptance (RCA).
If the contract is accepted and (e) is selected, then the agent can
renegotiate to any allocation that is rationally acceptable to the princi-
pal given that (e) can be costlessly enforced. Assume that the agent
randomizes its investment decision on some subset E

. Given that the
initial contract is accepted and that the agent has committed himself to
some allocation (m), it is easy to see that an agent that has invested
e will propose the new allocation (q^(e); t(m) + q^(e)  q(m)) which gives
the same payo to the principal and is thus accepted. In a self-selecting
renegotiation-proof contract, the initial contract is not renegotiated and
the agent tells the truth about his investment level so that q(e) = q^(e).
Anticipating the outcome of the renegotiation, the initial contract will
be self-selecting if and only if
t(e)  c(q^(e); e)  t(m) + q^(e)  q^(m)  c(q^(e); e) 8e;m 2 E

:
Since that relation must be true for all types played in equilibrium, it
follows that
t(e)  q^(e) = t(m)  q^(m) =   8e;m 2 E

;
where  is the principal's payo in that game when a contract is accepted
and carried out. I expect a contract to be of the form 

= (q^(e); q^(e) 
)
e2E

. Such a contract is accepted by any agent e for which
q^(e)     c(q^(e); e) = w^(e)    0;
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that is, whenever the payo  the principal asks for herself is less than
the realizable ex post surplus w^(e)+ c(0; e) as xed cost c(0; e) are to be
paid anyway. I then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the RCA game, there is no equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. There exists a Nash equilibrium where the agent randomizes on
E

= f0; e

(1)g with F = Prob(e = e

(1)) = w(0)=(w

(1) + c(0; e

(1)))
and the principal randomizes on  = f
w(0)
; 
w

(1)
g with 1   G =
Prob(

= 
w(0)
) = c(0; e

(1))=(w

(1)   w(0) + c(0; e

(1))). In equi-
librium, both players enjoy the same payos that they would have had
investment been observable.
Proof. The ex post realizable surplus function w^(e) + c(0; e) is strictly
increasing with derivative  c
e
(q^(e); e) + c
e
(0; e) > 0. It follows that it
is minimal at w(0). Hence, there is no point for the principal to oer
any contract 

for which  < w(0) since these contracts are strictly
dominated by 
w(0)
. Because of assumption (2), the agent never invests
more than . We can then restrict the strategy space of the principal
to contracts 

for which  2 [w(0); w() + c(0; )]. Given any such
contract 

, the agent's ex ante payo is given by the maximum between
the minimum loss in xed cost  min
E
c(0; e) and the maximum gains
from trade max
E
(w^(e)  ). Depending on , that payo is maximized
either in e = 0 or in e = e

(1); it follows that the agent will randomize
on the discrete support f0; e

(1)g with F = Prob(e = e

(1)). If the
agent plays e = 0, then the principal should play  = w(0). If the agent
plays e = e

(1), then the principal should play  = w

(1)+c(0; e

(1)). It
follows that the principal will play in the discrete support fw(0); w

(1)+
c(0; e

(1))g. No pure strategy equilibrium will exist as e = 0 is a strictly
best response (s.b.r) for the agent to  = w

(1) + c(0; e

(1)) which is a
s.b.r. to e = e

(1) which is a s.b.r. to  = w(0) which is a s.b.r. to
e = 0. Let G = Prob( = w

(1) + c(0; e

(1))). Given these numbers,
the players must be indierent over their best response strategies. This
yields the same expected payos for the agent and the principal as under
full observability:
 Gc(0; e

(1)) + (1 G)(w

(1)  w(0)) = G  (0) + (1 G)  0 = 0;
F (w

(1) + c(0; e

(1))) + (1  F )  (0) = Fw(0) + (1  F )w(0) = w(0);
and these equations solve for F and G. That is, the principal gets all the
surplus w(0) that could be created under full observability and the agent
gets none of it (with a market price of zero as an option). Q.E.D.
Although the nature of the mixed strategies is dierent, the fact that
unobservability has no eect on welfare in proposition 2 is related to
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proposition 1 in Gul (1997). The possibility of renegotiation destroys the
power of incentive contracts. Without these contracts, simple bargaining
subgames are not sucient to provide enough incentives for expected
welfare-enhancing investment to take place.
7 Conclusion
My results apply generally to Bayesian principal-agent models with ad-
verse selection. In these models, transfers are decomposed into \costs"
that remunerate factors of production and \informational rents" that are
left to the agent as an incitative to make him reveal his type. Here, I chal-
lenge this interpretation by ackowledging that an agent's \type" is most
likely to be the result of an ex ante maximizing choice. Hence, we should
not talk of \informational rents" but of quasi-rents. This interpretation
is important both on normative and positive grounds. From a normative
point of view, the mechanism design strategy followed here is robust to
the endogenous formation of types and requires only a good knowledge of
cost functions to be implemented as a practical compensenting scheme.
From a positive point of view, Bayesian models have very little predic-
tive power since the contracts they predict are supposed to be functions
of an elusive (at least for the econometrician) \type" distribution. One
can express doubts concerning the coherence of the assumption that
types are unobservable with the assumption of a common knowledge
distribution of types. The resolution of this paradox is to be found in
Harsanyi's (1967) classical exposition of incomplete information model
where the \type" distribution emerges as the result of some thought
equilibrium process that resolves the discrepancies between the players'
various beliefs. In a sense, the approach followed in this paper substi-
tutes that process with what can rationally be expected given factor
prices on the market and the available technology. Since the contracts
described in this paper depend only on market data, the theory should
have more predictive power.
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MR
AR AC(e)
LRMC
LRAC
MC(e)
MC(e*(p))
q*(1)q^(e*(p),1) q(e)q*(p)
1
p
Figure 1: The equilibrium contract.
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contract
AC(e*(1))
AC(e*(p))
AC(e)
LRMC
LRAC
MC(e*(1))
MC(e)MC(e*(p))
q*(1)q(e)q*(p)0.267
0.5
1
0.308
0.411
1.61 1.8 1.98 2.14 2.29 2.42 2.55 2.67 2.79 2.9 3
q
Figure 2: The equilibrium contract of example 1.
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contract
AC(e*(1))
AC(e*(p))
AC(e)
LRMC
LRAC
MC(e*(1))
MC(e)
MC(e*(p))
q*(1)q(e)q*(p)
0.5
1
0.25
0.375
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
q
Figure 3: The equilibrium contract of example 2.
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contract
AC(e*(1))
AC(e*(p)) AC(e)
LRMC
LRAC
MC(e*(1))
MC(e)MC(e*(p))
q*(1)q(e)q*(p)
0.5
1
0.375
0.485
0.75
0.125 0.1965 0.2702 0.3831 0.468 0.5965 1
q
Figure 4: The equilibrium contract of example 3.
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